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THE DIVORCE LAWS OF MEXICO
LIONEL M. SUMMEItS*
It was only during the troubled and dynamic course of the revolutions that swept
Mexico after the fall of President Diaz that absolute divorce was recognized by the
laws of the Mexican states," for prertvolutionary Mexico had been adamant in the
preservation of the -indissolubility of marriage, 2 permitting only separation from bed
and board or what is equivalent to our limited divorce. Moreover, lest one or more
of the twenty-eight states pass legislation not in conformity with this standpoint, the
Federal Congress enacted a decree, in 1874, providing that only the death of one of
the spouses could put an end to the matrimonial status of the couple3 The binding
effect of this decree on the several states, within -whose prerogatives the regulation of
marriage and divorce would normally fall, arose from the fact that it was enacted in
pursuance of an amendment to the constitution of 1857 by whose terms matrimony
was defined as a civil contract.4 However, by this same decree, the passage of laws
by the states permitting legal separation for grave reasons, was authorized. As this
permission was utilized5 it was not requisite, when the reforms of the revolution
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'Salvador 1. Reynoso writes: "En 1894, se present6 a la Cfmara de Diputados una iniciativa para
establecer el divorcio; fue vigorosamente combatida. suscit6 una violenta oposici6n en todo la Cimara y
produjo indecible alrma en la sociedad y en 1a opini6n publica, a tal grado, que el General Porfirlo Daz,
Presidente entonces de la Repdiblica, orden6 se retirara ]a iniciative y el matrimonio qued6 inclume, como
lo habla sido hasta entonces." Un cancer del hogar Mexicano-El divorcio (1924) 2 REvisrA JusnJicA nx
.& ECI LIaRE DE DXRacHo, 393, 399-400. Illustrative of the attitude even before 1894 is that, in
x883, Augustin Verdugo delivered a lecture to the Escuela Especial de Jurisprudencia, and asked his
hearers never to allow the laws of Mexico to permit divorce. The termination of this lecture was greeted
with "prolonged and thunderous applause." Discurso del Sefior D. Agustin Verdugo sobre el divordo
pronunciado en la Escuela especial de jiurisprudeneia, Mexico, 1883.
'Decree of Dec. 14, 1874, Art. 23, par. 9. 12 DUBLAN Y LozANo, Lvclst.Act6N MEXICANA, p. 683.
'The amendment referred to is the one of Dec. 25, 1873. 12 DmTLAN Y LoZA't, op. Cit. upra note 3,
at p. 502.
'The Civil Code of 1884 of the Federal District and of the Territories in effect at the time of the
revolution covered divorce in articles 226-256. The Federal District in Mexico corresponds to the District
of Columbia in the United States and, as in the case of the District of Columbia, the Federal Congress
legislates on its behalf as well as on behalf of the territories, namely Lower California and Quintana Roo.
For this or other reasons the laws of the Federal District and of the Territoriet exert a great influence in
Mexico, so much so that many of them are adopted in toto by the states and reenacted as their own legis-
lation. The provisions as to divorce, which as we shall see form an exception today, formed no exception
in the prerevolutionary period so that for all intents and purposes the above cited articles may be
considered the then law of Mexico.
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were introduced, to create overnight a system of law but merely necessary to adapt to
the needs of divorce a vinculo the legislation evolved in contemplation of divorce
a mensa e thoro.
The path to these new reforms was broken by a decree of December 29, x9r4
enacted by Carranza, then First Chief of the Constitutionalist Armies, that modified
the legislation of 1874 insofar as it prohibited the dissolution of marriage, provided
that absolute divorce could be granted for valid cause or on the mutual consent of
the parties (if the marriage had had three years duration), and authorized the
governors of the states to modify the laws of their respective- entities accordingly.8
Among the reasons for the promulgation of this edict, Carranza listed the tendency
of the poorer classes to enter into illegitimate unions and to avoid marriages for fear
of irreparable consequences, a situation that was apparently to be ameliorated by the
introduction of absolute di;rorce. Exactly a month later, on January 29, x915, Car-
ranza followed his own precepts.by reforming the Civil Code of the Federal District
and of the Territories (Lower California and Quintana Roo) in accordance with the
decree of December 29, 1914-7 Within a space of a little over two years this decree
was absorbed and succeeded by the "Law of Domestic Relations" among whose most
important provisions were those pertaining to divorce. In contemplation of sub-
sequent trends in the divorce policies of some of the Mexican states it is of interest
that it was expressly set forth among the "whereases" preceding the text of the law
that, in order to prevent foreigners and residents of the Mexican states from taking
advantage of this legislation, it was incumbent upon the parties seeking divorces to
have resided one year within the territorial jurisdiction of the competent court.0
This law remained in effect in the Federal District and the Territories until the
promulgation of a new civil code, on October z, 1932, whose Title V, Chapter o,
constitutes the present substantive law of divorce applicable in these localities.
While the legislation has assumed a new garb, it suffered few material changes in its
transmutation, the pertinent provisions of the code being primarily reenactments of
the corresponding sections of the "Law of Domestic Relations. '10
Following the initiative of the federal authorities legislating on behalf of the Fed-
CAoD .ICACION D) LOS DECRETOS DEL C. V zNv -ANo CAm zwA, Mzxico, D. F. 19,5, p. 147.
lid. p. x68. In x916 Carranza realized that the persons who had obtained a legal separation under the
old law were in an anomalous situation. Hence he provided that all those who had obtained a legal
separation under the old la* would thereafter be considered ipso facto as having been granted an
absolute divorce. See 3 EL CONSTrUcaoNA .SrA, 3rd "eoch, No. 174, May 31, x9z6.
cEnacted by Carranza on April 9, 1917. It is most readily available as a separate pamphlet. Th
divorce articles are 75-:o6.. For a discussion of this law, see Gaither, The Marriage and Divorce Laws
of Mexico (1923) 57 AM. L. REV. 404.
'Article so6 was the article dealing with this jurisdictional requirement. For comment as to methods
of proving one year's domicil, see Carlos C. Echeverria,. Proposic6n del Presidente del Tribunal Superior
del Dihsito Federal, para uniformar 14 Jurisprudencia sabre 14 aplicaci6n del arnuao zo6 de i lek y de
Relacioner Familiares (Dec. 1927-Jan. 1928) 5 REvisrA DE CIEHNCAS SocIALE , p. 657.
"The sources of the articles of the new civil code are listed by Ignacio Garda Tillez in Monvo%
COLABOXACj6N y CONCORDANCsAS DEL NUEVO Coameo CIVIL MEaMcNO .(93a). They may also be found
in the edition of this code by Francisco J. Santamafa
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eral District and of the Territories the states had, in the meantime, been reforming
their own laws. In some of them the laws enacted in the revolutionary period are
still in effect although in most divorce is controlled by legislation of more recent
date. If the experience of the past is any criterion it is likely that many of the states
will adopt as their own the provisions of the above mentioned civil code, including
the chapter on divorce. Of course this prophecy does not apply to those that have em-
barked on the policy of permitting quick, easy and cheap divorces. The pioneer in
this field was Yucatan for as early as 1918 it had adopted iconoclastic legislation
designed to expedite divorce. 1 Among the novel and unusual features of this legis-
lation was a provision that divorce could be obtained without the necessity of alleg-
ing or proving any grounds in justification of the decree. While it is not certain
that the initial radical steps were taken for the avowed purpose of attracting for-
eigners in search of easy divorces, such was their ultimate effect. Other states noting
the revenue-producing potentialities of this policy eventually followed suit. Cam-
peche, bordering on Yucatan, Morelos, situated in the central part of Mexico, and
Sonora, contiguous to the American frontier, were the first to imitate Yucatan. In
most recent years Chihuahua and Tamaulipas, lying immediately south of the Rio.
Grande, have followed in the footsteps of their sister states.
In view of the extreme liberality of these laws, they have acted, as it was intended
that they should act, as a magnet for thousands of Americans anxious to dissolve
their marital ties. Among the more prominent residents of the United States who
have taken advantage thereof a writer in Scribners lists Homer S. Cummings, Alda,
Frank Woodward, Bruce Reynolds, William Slavens McNutt Dolores del Rio and
William McFee.12 To facilitate their mission even further the travel agencies and
the hotels have collaborated with the lawyers so as to make the divorce quest of these
modern pilgrims as enjoyable as possible. To that end divorce tours, resembling
"Cook's Tours," with all.arrangements completed beforehand, have been offered to
the unhappily wedded.18 The total has been further swelled by those who have
availed themselves of the simple method of the mail order divorce. The exact num-
ber of American marriages from whose bonds surcease has been sought in Mexico is
difficult to estimate with any accuracy but the probabilities are that this number
would exceed ten thousand.14  It is even more difficult to determine how many of
1The arlier divorce laws of Yucatan arc discussed by John T. Vance, Jr. in The Divorce Laws of
Yucatan (1925) 13 GEo. L J., 227, 232. See also Cartwright, Yucatan Divorces (1932) A8 A. B. A. J.
307, and HAERMAN, THE DIVORCE LAws op MExico, (i93o) 16-17.
'Mason, Mexico's Cash-and-Carry Divorce for Americans (Oct. 1930) 88 SCSNHERS, 360.
i li'd.
!' Writing in 1929 Lindell T. Bates stated that "Probably well over two thousand divorces have been
pronounced between our citizens in the southern Republic since the War." The Divorce of Americans in
Mexico (i929) x5 A. B. A J. lo9. This figure was apparently accepted as sufficiently accurate by'Alfred
Cahen in his STATis'r3CAL ANALYSIS OF AMERCAN DivoRcE (1932), because he cites Bates with approval
on page 65. In an article in Today, entitled "Divorce by Mail-Ease and Cheapness of Mexican Decrees
Attract Thousands," William Atherton Du Puy states: "The figures for divorces granted there, according
to the Chamber of Commerce, show 5,260 in 1931, 3,985 in 1932, 2,437 in 1933:' (June 9, 1934) 1
ToDAY 8. Another indication of the large number of divorces granted is the statement that a judge in
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these purported divorces received by Americans are actually valid under the laws of
Mexico, how many, even though issued by a regularly constituted court, would not
be recognized even in that country, and how many are totally spurious.
Under the latter category fall a group of "divorces" represented by fictitious
papers foisted on Americans by a ring operating in Morelos. According to the New
York Times "These fake documents were obtained by procuring certified statements
of the validity of genuine divorces and then attaching these statements to the decrees
filled in by the lawyers themslves."15  14eedless to say these documents did not
change by one particle the matrimonial status of the persons defrauded.
The problem as to when a divorce issued by a regularly constituted court is de-
fective from the standpoint of Mexican jurisprudence is primarily a problem of con-
stitutional law as it has been interpreted and expounded by the Supreme Court of
Mexico in the decisions that it has rendered. It is true that one decision does not
result in a binding precedent determinative of the law, for in order that this result
be achieved it is necessary that the Supreme Court hand down five decisions on the
same point. Because of the comparative novelty of the radical divorce legislation,
five decisions on one point, are, on most questions unavailable.' But as the pro-
nouncements of this tribunal, even though they have not reached the status of bind-
ing precedent, are entitled to great respect, possibly as great as the obiter dica of our
own Supreme Court, they may be treated as the most authoritative exposition avail.
able of the true meaning of the constitution of the United Mexican States.
Above the laws of the states, the Supreme Court of Mexico has announced in
unequivocal terms, stands the constitution of the Union."7 Thus it has been held
that the Yucatan divorces, granted in the absence of mutual consent and without
valid cause, infringe the guarantees of the due process clause of that constitution s
Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua, granted 2,800 divorces to Americans in nineteen months. See New York
Times, April 29, 1934, P. 9, col. 2. Even allowing for exaggeration the above figures point to a very
considerable number of divorces involving Americam.
'New York Times, March 21, X934, p. 13, col. 2. See also id., March 5, 1934, P. 34, col. 4.
The editors of the Semanario Judicial de la Federado'n. 5a Epoca (the publication in which the
decisions of the Supreme Court are reported) periodically compile an index of points on which precedent
has been established. The latest index available, published in Vol. 33, PP. 3483 et seq. (1933) covers
cases from June 1, 1917 to December s, 3931. . There is nothing under the word divorce.
2 A Mexicah attorney, Belisario Becerra, in an article entitled "Divorcios, Legislacid6n de los Estadcs,"
(Sept. 1934) Ii Los TmrNAas, 427, writes: En materia de leyes de divorco, ban sido fecundos los
legisladores de los Estados y en&gica la actitud de la Supreme Corte, imponiendo sobre las leyes de los
Estados, que han pretendido pasar sobre los mandatos del art. 14 de la Constituci6n, el respeto que L
garantfas consignadas en dicho precepto se establecen, ... "
'Laura Rend6n de Matence, z8 Semanario Judicial de Ia Federad6n, 5a Epoca (cited hereinafter as
S. J. 5. E.) 631 (1927); Carmen Victoria G6mez Gonaez, 26 S. J. 5. E. 2399 (1930); Rafael A. Duarte
Moreno, 27 S. J. 5- E. 1368 (1930-1931); Antonio Medina, 32 S. J. 5. E. 3556 (1933). Campeche had
the same provision in its law and it also has apparently run afoul of the Supreme Court. The text of this
decision is, not available in the Semanaria ludidal-which runs over a year behind time-but a report
of the case in the New York Times indicates the scope of the decision. This report states: "The Supreme
Court has rendered a decision which is regarded as a blow to the divorce industry of several Mexieaa
states. On the grounds that the court granting the decree, in the State of Campeche, had not heard both
parties to the suit, the Supreme Court has annulled a divorce granted in 3927 to General Federko I.
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Even more drastic has been the action of the Supreme Court in holding unconstitu
tional the divorce law of Morelos of August 15, 1927 for the rcason that it wa!
expedited by the Provisional Governor without having been submitted to the legis,
lature of that state, this official thus arrogating to himself powers that properly be.
longed to the- legislative organ.1" The situation was apparently remedied by tht
adoption of a state constitution, on November 20, i93o, ratifying the acts of the
Provisional Governor but as this ratification could not be given a retroactive effect i!
did not affect purported divorces obtained prior to that time under the law of Augusl
15, 1927.
Important as the above decisions are, the holdings of the Supreme Court that a
divorce is invalid if service is not made on a non-resident in accordance with the laws
of the latter's domicil, are of even greater significance. In the case of Federico
Cervantes, a decision that merits special notice, the plaintiff sued the defendant, ap.
paretitly in the Federal District, for provisional maintenance (alimentos provisionales)
whereupon the latter interposed as a defence a divorce decree he had obtained id the
courts of Morelos.20 However as the defendant in the divorce action, who was the
plaintiff in the suit for provisional maintenance, had not been served in conformity
with the laws of the Federal District where she resided, the courts thereof refused to
give full faith and credit to the divorce decree, a refusal that was thereafter sustained
as proper by the Supreme Court. The point that the requirements as to service
exacted by the laws of Morelos had been complied with, was considered immaterial
because Morelos could not give its laws extraterritorial effect.l The fundamental
importance of this and similar decisions can easily be realized as they place a srious
impediment in the path of the divorce seeker by forcing him to serve the defendant
according to the laws of the matrimonial domicil and noz according to the easy
requirements of the lex forio
There is still another series of decisions of the Supreme Court that needs careful
scrutiny, namely the group that bears on the proper jurisdiction, or rather venue, for
the trial of divorce actions. The concept of marriage as a res is foreign to Mexican
Berlanga, chief of military operations in the State. The general remarried after obtaining the divorce."
New York Times, Dec. 1, 1933, p. 5, col. 5.
'Julieta Chinfreau de Bixler, 29 S. J. 5. E. 532 (X931-1932); NIcolas E. Tejada, 30 S. J. 5. . 9a
(x932); Micaela Sinchez 4e Leuze, 32 S. J. S. E. 862 (1933).
W,33 S. J. 5. E. 977 (1933).
' While this decision speaks primarily of residence rather than domicil it appears from another decision
of the Supreme Court that domicil is the correct criterion. See the case of Enriqueta Mufioz de Rodrfguez,
29 S. J. 5. E. x266 (193x-x932). See also Maria Luisa Gdmez de Varcla, 31 S. J. 5. E. 1347 (1932), and
Esther Delgado de Zdrraga, 28 S. J. 5. E. 928 (2931). The headnote to the Varela case summarizes the
principle of law involved in the following language: "'Si se comprueba que la persona demandada en
juicio de divorcio, ea el Estado de Morelos, tiene su domicilio fuera de dicha Entidad Federativa, aun
cuando el emnplazaniento haya sido hecho por medio de una publicacidn en cl Diario Oficial de dicho
Estado, debe considerarse que no ha sido debidamente emplazada.y por tanto, que es procedente el amparo
contra la sentencia relativa, ya que se la ha privado de defens- por faha de emplazamiento." A more
recent case, apparently on. the same point, was referred to in the New York Times, Sept. 5, 1934, p. iz,
coLz.
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law so that if a court has jurisdiction over both parties to a divorce suit it has juris-
diction to try the suit, barring local statutes such as the one in the Federal District
which require cne year's residence prior to the commencement of suit.22 However
the Supreme Court has held that if suit were brought in a jurisdiction other than
that of the matrimonial domicil the defendant could institute proceedings to have
the divorce action litigated in the courts of the domiciliary state, district, or territory.
And, although, according to the Civil Code of the Federal District and of the Terri-
tories of 1884 and the corresponding sections of most, if not all, of the civil codes of
the states, the domicil of the wife followed that of the husband, the matrimonial
domicil was not to be changed by the mere transfer of residence on the part of the
husband 28
Following the adoption of the new Civil Code of 1932, married women acquired,
according to this code, the privilege of acquiring a domicil in their own right. 4
Hence, a more recent ruling, more than likely influenced by this new reform, has
held that in order for the matrimonial domicil to be changed it was necessary for
both spouses to agree to such change. Failing this agreement the conjugal domicil
remained where it was, and it is at its situs that a divorce suit should be prosecuted?5
It will be observed that, strictly speaking, these decisions do not deal with the
validity or invalidity of divorce decrees under the Mexican constitution. If the de-
fendant in such a case has been properly served and fails to take advantage of his
or her privilege of instituting proceedings to have the divorce litigated in the forum
of the matrimonial domicil the divorce is valid even though decreed by the courts
of another jurisdiction. The problem that remains undetermined is as to the effect,
under Mexican law, of a decree rendered by a Mexican court when the matrimonial
domicil is situated abroad, and the defendant has not submitted to the jurisdiction
of that court. In such an instance the defendant would not possess the opportunity
of instituting the proceedings mentioned above. Lacking such opportunity it is
obvious that he or she has suffered a very real prejudice, and it is not inconceivable
wSee the case of Rafael P& ez Taylor, 24 S. 7. 5. E. 543 (1929), where it was held that a Morelos
court had jurisdiction even though the couple were domiciled in the Federal District, as the wife sub-
mitred to the court's jurisdiction by entering an appeal.
"In the case of Luis G. Ibeni, a5 S. '. S. E. 936 (.9:9-93o), the Supreme Court stated at p. 943:
"No es, pues, ci hecho de que el marido vaya a trabajar a tal o cual lugar, dejando a stu mujer en el
domicilio que ten[an, el que puede determinar, para los efectos de la Icy, Ia existencia del nuevo domicilio;
es el Animo de cambiarlo por pare de aqu~i, unido al requerimiento de hsta para que siga a zu marido y
ni una ni otra cosa ha sido probada por el Sefior lberri, que es al que le incumbla la prueba y debe
presumirse por lo mismo, que no ha existido cambio de domicilio y que &te sigue existiendo en la ciudad
de Mixico, y determina la competencia de sus jueces para conocer del juicio de divorcio de que se trata."
" Article 29. In the annotated edition to this code by Francisco J. Sansamaria, the annotaier says of
this amendment: "Fundamentalmente modificada la teoria del domicilio. El art. 32 del Cddigo Civil de
1884, que daba a la mujer casada el domicilio del marido, se suprimi6, para dar a aqu6lla domicilio
propio, en virtud de haberse equiparado la capacidad jurldica del hombre y la mujer."
'Case of Dr. Loyo. Not as yet available in the Semanario Iudicid. However a summary of the
decision and extracts therefrom were printed in the newspaper Er Nadonat of Mexico City, March as,
2935.
316 LAW AND CON=MF"rORARY PRODLEMS
that the Supreme Court of Mexico would take this factor into consideration and
might hold that a divorce obtained in those circumstances is defective.
At this point the query must be raised as to whether divorces granted in con-
travention of constitutional precepts are subject to collateral, as well as to direct
attack, on the ground that they are defective ab initio and therefore not entitled to
full faith and credit under the Mexican constitution. For lack of authoritative pro.
nouncements on the subject, the question, unfortunately, cannot be answered dog.
matically. -H-the_ defect lies in faulty service beyond the confines of the territorial
jurisdiction of the forum, it would appear, from the Cervantes case, that the divorce
is not entitled to full faith and credit. According to Anglo-Saxon theories of con.
flicts of laws the Cervantes decision is easily explainable on the basis that it involved
the question of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, a point that may always
be raised by collateral attack. However the opinion of the Supreme Court is not
based on this reasoning so that it is not altogether unlikely that all divorces im-
properly decreed in the light of the Mexican constitution, might be considered a.
subject to such attack. And if these divorces are not to be given full faith and credit
within the country of their origin it would be anomalous indeed to regard them as
unimpeachable beyond the borders of Mexico.
It is regrettable that no decision of the Supreme Court has been found dealing
with the so-called mail order divorces. However a hint as to the attitude of re-
sponsible officials of the Mexican Government with regard to these divorces may be
gathered from a-circular sent in x933 by the Mexican Foreign Office to all Mexican
consuls instructing them to disregard the solicitations of a Mexican attorney whc
wished to enlist the aid of these consuls in the procurement of divorce cases. The
pertinent part of this circular states that "From the point of view of private inter.
national law, divorces obtained by- correspondence in accordance with the local lam
of the State of Chihuahua are legally null, for which reason propaganda by our con
suls in favor of these divorces would only redound in the long run to the prejudice ol
Mexico. .. :,7 Whether the Foreign Office still maintains this policy and whethei
the Supreme Court would view these divorces from the same angle is, of course
impossible to determine.
From the foregoing paragraphs it will be seen that there are many moot pointA
as yet unadjudicated. Nevertheless it seems safe to conclude that the only divorce
that would unquestionably be upheld as valid by the Supreme Court is one when
both parties have actually submitted to the jurisdiction of the tribunal granting the
"See however Gregory Mason's comments on the decision of the Supreme Court in one of the earlie
cases involving Yucatan divorces. He says: -We should remember that the whole theory of Mexicat
jurisprudence and government is different from ours in fundamental respects. Believing in a complet
separation -of judicial and legislative functions, Mexicans view with repugnance such power as the Suprem
Court of our United States wields. Under their theory the decision of their court in the case above men
tioned did not make nugatory the Yucatan law except in the partcsdar case upon which appeal war lalke
to the cour. That decision in itself did not invalidate previous or subsequent divorces granted under thi
Yucatan law whether to natives or to foreigners." Mason, supra note z2.,
" Circular No. 111-85-114, 61 Boletin Oficial de la Secretaria de Relaciones Extcrior.s, Oct 1933, p. 102
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decree. Moreover, in the light of the opinion of the Foreign Office, it is not certain
if submission by mail would be considered sufficient.
Up to this point a discussion of the substantive and adjective features of the
divorce laws of the various states has been avoided in order to permit the develop-
ment of this analysis against the background of the decisions of the Supreme Court.
Inasmuch as there are twenty-nine jurisdictions in Mexico, each with its respective
laws, it is obviously impossible to dissect all of these laws within the scope of this
article, even though many of them are similar and, in some cases, identical Instead
the laws of the Federal Distrift and of the Territories,28 whose provisions are likely
to be imitated widely, and the laws of the State of Chihuahua,29 a state that is one
of the newest havens for American divorce migrants, will be chosen as representative
of the conservative and radical legislations respectivly.P0
According to the Civil Code of the Federal District and of the Territories divorce
may be obtained on seventeen grounds. These grounds are (z) the adultery of either
spouse; (2) the fact that the wife gives birth to a child conceived before marriage
and declared to be illegitimate; (3) the proposal of the husband to prostitute the
wife; (4) the incitement to crime of one spouse by the other; (5) the corruption of
the children, including step-children; (6) incurable impotency, syphilis, tuberculosis,
or other chronic and incurable disease, that, in addition, is contagious and hereditary;
(7) incurable ifisanity provided it has lasted two years; (8) unjustified absence from
the home for more than six months; (9) absence from the home for more than one
year if the original departure was motivated by a cause justifying divorce; (zo) dis-
appearance or presumption of death legally declared"1 ; (zi) cruelty, threats, or
serious insults; (12) non-support, if the remedies provided by law are unavailing;
(13) the making of a slanderous accusation to the effect that the spouse slandered
is guilty of a crime punishable by at least two years' imprisonment; (z) the com-
mission of an infamous, as contrasted with a political, crime, punishable by two
years' imprisonment; (x5) inveterate gambling, drunkenness or drug addiction, when
*Articles 266-29z of the Civil Code and Atides z56, 674-68a of the Code of Civil Procedure. For-
an English summary of this legislation, see 2 MAx nNrx-HurzEL, LAw Dtix y, z935, Taw Digests,
Mexico.
"See note 33, isf."
"It is of course axiomatic that no'-Mexicans. seeking divorces in Mexico must conduct' their cuit in
accordance with the adjective law of the jurisdiction in which they sue. However, a Mexican court went
further and held that foreigners could not obtain a divorce unless they could establish that they would be
entted to a divorce pursuant to the laws of ihe country of their nationa4ty. A critic of this decision
terms it erroneous, and, in the light of the common practice of the Mexican courts of applying'Mexican
law to foreign divorce litigants, this criticism seems justified. See Trinidad Garcia, El divorci de ex-
trneros en MxCO (Jan.-March, z932) 3 P'.arrA GENmtAL Da Dxzcuo Y JuvisPauDcENcL 164. The text
of the decision criticized precedes the comment.
' Articles 648 e: seq. of the Civil Code of 1932 contain elaborate provisions for the safeguarding of
the interests of a person who has disappeared, including the naming of a representative for the absentee.
Two years after such nomination a formal. declaration of absence is made. The declaration of the pre-
sumption of death to which this paragraph refers occurs two years after a person has disappeared in a
war, shipwreck, explosion, conflagration, earutuake or simila disaster. See Article 7o$ of the above
code.
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the ruin of the family is threatened or when these vices constitute a continual cause
of marital discord; (16) the commission of an act by one spouse against the person
or property of the other, which, if it were committed by a third party would be
punishable by at least one year's imprisonment; (17) mutual consent, provided that
a year has passed since the celebration of the marriage.
It needs no extended comment to show that the grounds enumerated are many
and varied.P1' However the divorce can only be asked for within six months after
the grounds forming the basis of the suit come to the attention of the plaintiff and
divorce may not be had if there has been tacit or express condonation. Presuriiably
these limitations would not apply tb a continuing ground such as insanity, although
the code is silent on-this point.
The procedural requirements differ according to circumstances. When both
spouses mutually consent to the termination of the marriage, are of age, have no
children and are of accord as to the liquidation of the community property, they
may present themselves before the clerk of the civil register of their domicil -and
manifest their intention of procuring a divorce. In fifteen days they return and if
they still desire to dissolve their marriage the clerk will declare them divorced 8 2
In the event that the parties are not eligible to follow this simple procedure but
nevertheless mutually consent to the divorcd they must resort to the courts, present-
ing an agreement embodying provisions with regard to maintenance during the
proceedings, the care and custody of the children both before and afteir the divorce,
and the administration of the community property pending the termination of the
marital status and the liquidation of this property thereafter. After the petition is
entered the judge calls the parties to two conferences, about fifteen days apart,
during whose course he attempts to effect a reconciliation, but if his efforts are fruit-
less he will grant the divorce. At the same time the court hears a representative of
the state who passes on the adequacy of the agreement presented by the parties, par-
ticularly with the view of determining whether the interests of the children are
properly safeguarded, for it is necessary that the rights of the latter be protected
before the divorce can be decreed. Divorce by mail is out of the question as the
parties must appear personally at the conferences..
If divorce is not by mutual consent it is naturally incumbent on the plaintiff to
allege and prove his suit. During the course of the proceedings the judge dictates
provisional measures for the protection of the children, with regard to maintenance
and so forth. The decree, when it is rendered, determines the custody of the children
according to the rules laid down in the code. After the marriage is at an end the
innocent wife is entitled to alimony so long as she live honestly and does not remarry.
'4s Cf. the grounds for divorce in Nevada, enumerated in Ingram and Ballard, The Budnes: of Misra.
gory Divorce in Nevada, supra, at p. 304, n. 4
"A discussion of mutual consent divorces and this procedure from the more conservative Mexican view-
point may be found in Guu.ximo Huura zo VwAmo pt.s T PLAuNcm Dm. Divoicto (Mexico, Jan.
1933), 41 a seq. This procedure is an innovation brought with the new civil code.
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The innocent husband is, however, entitled to alimony only if he is indigent and is
incapable of supporting himself. An interesting provision is that the guilty party is
responsible in damages to the innocent party for the losses and prejudices suffered
as the result of the divorce.
While the procurement of a divorce under these articles of the code is not difficult,
there does not seem to have been any effort made to cater deliberately -to the foreign
divorce trade, even though Americans have taken advantage thereof, especially in
Lower California. Rather the law expresses the new ideas of resurgent Mexico, among
them that the preservation of an unhappy marriage is of benefit neither to society
nor to the individuals concerned. The same cannot be said of the laws of Chihua-
hua, a state that became a divorce center with the passage of the law of January 15,
1932, said to have been sponsored by Governor Roberto Fierro, who, prior to his
assumption of the gubernatorial office, had gained prominence by making a non-stop
flight from Washington to Mexico City.3 3 For one reason or another this enactment
did not long survive but was replaced by the law of August x, i933. 4
The grounds for divorce enumerated in this latter law parallel in most instances
the ones specified in the Civil Code of the Federal District and of the Territories.
However, even a cursory examination will reveal that in the Chihuahua statute they
appear in a far more liberal form. As a typical example abandonment of the home
for three, instead of six, months is Sufficient to justify divorce. Moreover, incom-
patibility of character is made an additional basis for the dissolution of the marriage,
an addition that is of primary importance as it is upon this ground that most of the
purported divorces of Americans are obtained."
According to the Chihuahua law the court of the situs of the residence of the
plaintiff has jurisdiction to try the case, this jurisdictional fact being established by
proof of registration in the municipal register of the locality wherein the plaintiff
alleges he has his abode. Inasmuch as this registration apparently can be made on
the day of arrival it is obvious that no insuperable bar. is presented to the migratory
divorce seeker. Moreover, purported jurisdiction is acquired by the express or tacit
consent of the parties, the statute going so far as to say that there is tacit submission
when a defendant who has been properly served does not raise the issue of juris-
diction.
In enacting the requirements as to service of process the drafters of the statute
were obviously confronted with the Cervantes decision. Accordingly they stipulated
that if the defendant reside abroad service should be made in conformity with the
laws of his or her country. Whether any summons to appear in a Mexican court
"New York Times, Dec. 1, 1933, p. 5, col. 5. For an English translation of this law with some
prefatory comments, see SALVmfoX FxAsco Uusu, FuNDAmENTALs o T E Mwwtcs Divolcp LAws--NEw
DivotcE LAw? o, = STATz o CHmuArouA, . d.
" Available in pamphlet form, LEY DFL DIVORCIO--EN VlGOR DEUSE EL DIA I DE AGO6TN DE 1933,
Chihuahua, Imprenta de la Escuela de Artes y Oficios, n. d.
"William Atherton Du Puy, supra note 14, states "Tni is ground for divorce in 9o pr cent of the
cae. It is a rather hard ground to refute. Its mere assertion is quite .nough before a sympathetic court"
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could ever be served in any of the states of the United States in conformity with the
respective laws, is a question that the Chihuahua lawyers overlooked, intentional
or otherwise. In case the residence of the defendant is unknown, service may I
had by publication, but if it develops during the proceedings that the plaintiff W
not ignorant thereof, the trial will be declared a void trial"
If an answer is filed or if the term for answering has elapsed without the d
fendant having interposed a defence, an action, or rather inaction, that is considerc
equivalent to a denial, the court opens the case for the submission of proof for
period not exceeding ten days. On the terminatioii of this period hearings arc hel
within the next twenty-four hours. Within another twenty-four hours of their coi
clusion the decision must be rendered. All told, the elapsed time, from the beginnir
to the end of the suit, including time for service, together with the interval allowt
for the defendant to answer (this may be as low as three days), will probably be i
the neighborhood of three weeks. In the case of divorce by mutual consent, there i
of course, no necessity for service or hearings. Hence, according to the Chihuaht
law the divorce may be granted immediately.
The courts of Chihuahua have, pursuant to the statute, the power to graj
alimony on the petition of the plaintiff. Actually, at least insofar as foreigners ai
concerned, this power is seldom if ever exercised. With regard to the custody i
children of foreign divorce seekers the problem is sidestepped through the mediul
of declaring that the situation of children resident abroad shall remain unaltere,
Neither do the courts attempt to rule on the property rights of the parties.
While divorce by mail is not permitted in specific language the provisions pc
mitting appearance by attorney achieve this end. It has been estimated that the pri
of such a divorce ranges between one hundred to two hundred dollars.37
Juxtaposing the provisions of the law of Chihuahua against the opinions of t
Supreme Court of Mexico, it will be seen that these provisions are in apparent coi
formity with the standards' established by that court. However, it is possible th
this conformity is more apparent than real. Let us suppose the case of a husban,
resident in New York, who, not being able to obtain a divorce according to the lay
of that state, procures a divorce on the basis of incompatibility of character, in Ch
huahua. So f r the case is typical, but let us further suppose that the wife, instead 4
doing nothing or seeking her remedies in the courts of New York, decides to conte
the case in Mexico. If she so decides there are at least three arguments she mig]
adduce against the validity of the decree. To begin with she could argue that ii
compatibility of character, as the term is construed in that state, is so vague as to I
tantamount to no ground at all, and, hence, the Supreme Court's reasoning in holdir
defective Yucatan divorces obtained without cause is applicable. Secondly she coul
sIt is of interest to note in this connection that the choice of service of process is apparently left 1
some attorneys, specializing in Chihuahua divorces for Americans, to the option of the plaintiff. S
Bergeson, The Divorce Mill Advertises, infra, at p. ooo, n. 000.81 See Du Puy, supra note 14. And see Bergeson, The Divorce Mill Advertiser, infra, at p. ooo.
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argue that even if service were made according to the method prescribed in the Civil
Practice Act for the service of a summons in a divorce action, service was not made
in accordance with the laws of New York as its provisions as to service apply only
if the divorce suit is to be litigated in the New Yrk Supreme Court. Thus in the
contemplation of the laws of New York there has not been any service and under
the Cervantes case Chihuahua laws would be inapplicable beyond her borders.
Finally she could argue that suit should have been brought at the place of the matri-
monial domicil. Not having the recourse open to residents of Mexico of instituting
proceedings to have the proper court take cognizance of the suit, her rights have been
materially prejudiced in contravention of the Mexican constitution. It is, naturally,
not known how the Supreme Court would receive these arguments and it is possible
that it would consider them all specious and without merit. But until the court so
decides they should offer food for thought to the prospective divorce seeker.
To prophesy the future trend of Mexican divorces would require the powers of
divination of a Delphic oracle. If the courts of the United States recognize some of
the decrees, if the depression continues, making the comparatively cheap Mexican
divorce particularly attractive, and if the Supreme Court of Mexico does not render
any more decisions unfavorable to the radical divorce laws, the Mexican divorce
business may flourish. On the other hand one or more factors may contribute to its
possible decrease. Thus the standing of Mexican divorce decriees would certainly
not be helped by adverse rulings either from the Supreme Court of Mexico or from
the courts of the American states. The competition of Cuba may make itself felt.
The action of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York in combatting ad-
vertising of divorce lawyers may have effect, at least in New York. Finally it should
be mentioned that a bill has been introduced in Congress to bar Mexican divorces
from the mails. If it should pass, it would have a deterrent influence on that type-
of divorce at least.
Probably the next few years will tell.
